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# Establishing and Protecting a Chain of Trust with UEFI

Spring 2017 UEFI Seminar and Plugfest

March 27 - 31, 2017

Presented by David Chen (Insyde)

# Agenda



- What is the Root of Trust?
- What is Secure Boot?
- What is Measured Boot?
- UEFI and Firmware Updates
- Next Steps



# What is the Root of Trust?

# Root of Trust is a Security Concept




- Method to trust the system boot path has not been hacked by scheme like root kit
- Hardware and UEFI Firmware maintain Root of Trust until control transfers to OS
  - Hardware initiates Root of Trust:
    - Hardware starts CPU execution and makes some checks
    - Hardware hands off to the trusted UEFI Firmware
    - UEFI Firmware must maintain the Chain of Trust
  - Hardware is the physical Root of Trust
  - UEFI Firmware must protect Root of Trust

# UEFI & Root of Trust



- UEFI & hardware provide features to protect the Root of Trust
  - UEFI Specifications have protection features
    - Authenticated variables
    - Secure Boot databases
    - Secure Boot policies
  - Modern hardware has protection features
    - Regions of Read & Write locks
    - SMIs generated by Write attempts
- UEFI Firmware uses these features to protect the Chain of Trust
- Trust is about the method of trust and trust systems

# Traditional Boot is Not Secure





# What is Secure Boot?



# UEFI Image Signing



- Signing is creating a hash of the protected content and encrypting that hash with a private key held secure by the software author
  - Hashing always generates the same result from the same input
  - Process has very few collisions
    - Mathematically impossible to create a useful hacked image
- Signature checking is a two-step process
- Hash the code to be validated
- Decrypt the hash stored by signing process using the public key and compare with the value created in signing step
- Certificates controlled by Certificate Authorities or OEMs
- Private Keys should be protected!
  - Control physical and electronic access to Private Keys



# UEFI Secure Boot




- UEFI Firmware verifies the signature of external firmware and software before execution
  - Option ROMs (Graphics, Network)
  - OS Bootloader Images (Windows, Linux, Android, custom OSs)
  - Test Firmware (Factory firmware, built-in diagnostics)
  - Boot Applications in embedded devices (Drone Flight app)
- The image must be signed by a trusted signer
- Secure Boot process verifies that only trusted images execute

# UEFI Secure Boot & Root of Trust




1




Power On

2




BIOS Initializes Everything

3




BIOS Locks H/W

4



BIOS Loads & Verifies OS Bootloader Signature

5



Boot Loader Verifies OS Image and Loads Trusted OS




# What is Measured Boot?

# UEFI Image Measuring



- For export, TPM Trusted Boot defined by TCG specifications
- For China domestic, the TCM specification is used
- Measuring uses the PCR register to create a kind of hash of important boot stages
- There are several PCR registers defined to contain the hash of particular elements
- OS checks specific PCR values to discover if there were unexpected changes to the boot path elements
- OS must be informed if authorized changes occur, like if the firmware is updated

# UEFI & Measurements





# UEFI and Firmware Updates

# Firmware Updates




- OS or OEM website can provide updates
  - Windows update already supports
  - Can update UEFI Firmware
  - Can update other firmware components
  - Firmware publishes a list of all updatable elements (get table name)
- Update capsule can be stored on HDD or in memory
  - UEFI reboots to launch the chain of trust and root of trust
  - Verifies the signature on the capsule
  - Updates the correct firmware
- Your system should support UEFI FW Update

# UEFI & Firmware Updates



- System Update Process:







# Next Steps



# Call to action



- Enable Secure Boot
  - Protect the Root of Trust in OS Boot
- Support TPM 2.0 or TCM
  - Load measurements into TPM or TCM PCR<sub>s</sub>
- Support UEFI Firmware updates
  - Provide updates to end users

Thanks for attending the Spring  
2017 UEFI Seminar and Plugfest



For more information on the  
UEFI Forum and UEFI  
Specifications, visit  
<http://www.uefi.org>



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